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Abstract 
 
With the rapid development of RFID technology, 
the EPCglobal network has drawn considerable 
attention from both research and industry 
communities, which enables supply chain partners to 
automatically share information and improve the 
visibility of supply chains. As the information shared 
in the EPCglobal network is usually sensitive and 
valuable, security mechanisms should be provided. 
In this paper, we aim at designing and implementing 
a secure information sharing platform in the 
EPCglobal network with a focus on authorization 
mechanism. We also design and implement a track 
and trace application based on the proposed secure 
platform so as to demonstrate its feasibility and 
practicality. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the rapid development of Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) technology, RFID-enabled 
supply chain networks have drawn considerable 
attention from both research and industry 
communities [1-3]. As an industry standard of RFID-
enabled supply chain networks, the EPCglobal 
network is designed with the intention of increasing 
visibility of objects within supply chains [4]. The 
EPCglobal network consists of the following 
components: EPC tags, RFID readers, Application 
Level Events (ALE) interface, EPC Information 
Service (EPCIS), EPC Object Naming Service 
(EPCONS) and EPC Discovery Service (EPCDS) [4]. 
In the EPCglobal network, each physical product is 
associated with an RFID tag, represented by a unique 
Electronic Product Code (EPC). This EPC can be 
retrieved from an RFID tag wirelessly via an RFID 
reader without contact-of-sight. An EPC code and 
associated event information are usually processed 
by a middleware (ALE), and stored locally at each 
supply chain partner's EPCIS [5]. EPCDS and 
EPCONS are designed to locate EPCIS systems, 
from which users can obtain the addresses of EPCIS 
systems which store the detailed event information 
about a given EPC of interest. EPCDS and EPCONS 
facilitate the information sharing among distributed 
EPCIS systems. EPCIS, EPCDS and EPCONS are 
collectively called EPCglobal network services, 
which constitute an information sharing platform for 
the EPCglobal network. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is 
still a lack of integrated prototypes for the EPCglobal 
network services so far due to many challenges such 
as high cost, lack of standards for EPCDS, security 
and privacy issues, information sharing issues, and 
voluminous data issues [6]. Among them, the 
security and privacy issues and the lack of EPCDS 
standards are the most significant challenges. As the 
information stored and shared in EPCglobal network 
is usually very sensitive (which may reveal inventory 
level, trading partners, and business plan), the 
security and privacy concerns thwart a widespread 
adoption of the EPCglobal network [2]. Even though 
there is a large body of research work on the security 
and privacy aspects of communications between 
RFID tags and readers, the security and privacy 
issues on the EPCglobal network services (EPCDS, 
EPCIS and EPCONS) have not been rigorously 
studied [7,8]. However, as the information stored and 
shared in the EPCglobal network services is usually 
valuable and sensitive, supply chain partners hesitate 
to use the EPCglobal network without adequate 
security and privacy protection mechanisms. 
Therefore, it is important to address the security and 
privacy concerns in the design and implementation 
of the EPCglobal network services. In particular, we 
need to design and implement a secure and efficient 
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2. To date, except for the standard of EPCONS, there is still no standard of EPCDS released so far [4]. 
EPCDS which is a search engine in the EPCglobal 
network. EPCDS helps users locate EPCIS systems 
so as to share information among different EPCIS 
systems. Without EPCDS a full visibility of objects 
in supply chains cannot be realized. 
In this work, we aim to design and implement a 
secure platform for information sharing in the 
EPCglobal network. We have three primary goals, 
namely 1) facilitating global information sharing 
among supply chain partners; 2) supporting 
authorization mechanisms in EPCglobal network 
services; 3) reducing the cost of managing and 
maintaining supply chain partners' data and 
authorization policies. For facilitating global 
information sharing among supply chain partners, an 
EPCDS server is designed and implemented. We 
implement an EPCDS server without considering 
EPCONS because the latter provides search services 
at class-level only while EPCDS provides query 
services at item-level [4]. In order to protect supply 
chain partners' data in EPCglobal network services, 
EPCIS and EPCDS are both extended to support 
authorization mechanisms such that supply chain 
partners can define access control policies in EPCIS 
and EPCDS systems so as to specify which users are 
allowed to access their data. As authentication is 
prerequisite of authorization, an authentication 
mechanism is enabled in our implementation. We 
observe that both data and authorization policies in 
EPCDS are subsets of those in EPCIS systems. In 
order to reduce the cost of managing and maintaining 
supply chain partners' data and authorization policies, 
we provide a choice so that supply chain partners can 
automatically publish data and authorization policies 
into EPCDS from their EPCIS systems. In summary, 
the major contribution of this paper includes the 
design and implementation of secure EPCIS, EPCDS, 
as well as a secure track and trace application, which 
demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of 
building a secure platform for information sharing in 
EPCglobal network. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 gives the background and related 
work of our research. Section 3 presents the design 
of a secure prototype for EPCglobal network services. 
The implementation detail of the prototype is given 
in Section 4. Section 5 presents a discussion of the 
proposed prototype. A track & trace application is 
described in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background and Related work 
 
2.1. EPCglobal Network 
 
As an industrial standard of RFID-enabled supply 
chain networks, the EPCglobal network provides a 
platform for supply chain partners to share product 
information [4]. After registering into the EPCglobal 
network, supply chain partners can publish event 
information of products into the EPCglobal network 
and share the information with others in internet. The 
event information can be used to enhance the 
visibility of the location and movement of objects 
within supply chains. 
The architecture of the EPCglobal network is 
described in a standard document [4]. Figure 1 
illustrates the EPCglobal network, including EPC 
Discovery Service (EPCDS), EPC Information 
Service (EPCIS), EPC Object Naming Service 
(EPCONS) and an RFID sub-system, where the 
RFID sub-system consists of RFID tags and readers. 
In the EPCglobal network, each component plays 
a unique and important role. The RFID sub-system is 
in charge of capturing event information when 
physical objects move across different companies, 
e.g., manufacturers, suppliers and retailers. The event 
information is processed and delivered to EPCIS 
systems via Application Level Events (ALE) 
interface. EPCIS mainly contains two major 
components: EPCIS repository and EPCIS query 
interface. The delivered event information is stored 
in the EPCIS repository and accessed by end users 
through the EPCIS query interface. Usually, each 
company has its own RFID sub-system and an 
EPCIS system, which enable information sharing in 
a local domain. In order to support global 
information sharing within a supply chain network, 
EPCONS and EPCDS are introduced in the 
EPCglobal network2, so that a full visibility of 
supply chains can be realized. 
EPCDS and EPCONS are both designed to help 
users locate EPCIS systems which store detailed 
events information. EPCONS is designed following 
the existing internet Domain Name System to locate 
EPCIS systems while EPCDS works as a search 
engine. The mainly difference between EPCONS and 
EPCDS is that, while EPCDS provides query 
services for item-level information, EPCONS 
provides search services for class-level information 
only. EPCDS is more powerful and useful than 
EPCONS in locating EPCIS systems. Therefore, we 
focus on EPCDS instead of EPCONS in this paper.  
 
2.2. EPC Discovery Service 
 
EPC Discovery Service (EPCDS) is the search 
engine for the EPCglobal network, allowing users to 
find EPCIS systems which store detailed event 
information about EPC of interest. According to 
previous research work, there are three different 
models for EPCDS: directory model, relay model 
and aggregating model [10]. 
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Figure 1. Architecture of the EPCglobal network [9]. 
 
 
Figure 2. Information flow in EPCglobal network services with EPCDS supporting directory model 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Information flow in EPCglobal network services with EPCDS supporting relay model 
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Figure 4. Information flow in EPCglobal network services with EPCDS supporting aggregating model 
 
In the directory model, the EPCDS system 
manages a directory of EPC and corresponding 
EPCIS systems’ addresses. The information flow in 
EPCglobal network services with EPCDS supporting 
the directory model is shown in Figure 2. When a 
product attached with an RFID tag is processed by a 
supply chain partner, the corresponding event 
information is collected via the partner’s RFID sub-
system and transmitted to its EPCIS system. When 
the EPCIS system receives the event information 
about an EPC tag for the first time, it notifies an 
EPCDS system that it has the detailed event 
information about this EPC (line 1 in Figure 2). 
When a user searches for the information about a 
product with a given EPC, he first issues a query to 
the EPCDS to obtain the addresses of EPCIS systems 
which have the detailed information about this EPC 
(lines 2 and 3 in Figure 2). Next, the user queries 
each EPCIS system respectively using the addresses 
returned by the EPCDS for the detailed event 
information (lines 4 and 5 in Figure 2). 
In the relay model, the EPCDS system does not 
return the addresses of EPCIS systems immediately 
upon request. Instead, it redirects the query request 
to corresponding EPCIS systems. The information 
flow in this case is shown in Figure 3. Similar to the 
directory model, EPCIS system notifies the EPCDS 
system that it has the detailed event information 
about an EPC tag when it receives the event 
information about this EPC for the first time. When a 
user searches for the information about a given EPC, 
a query is sent to the EPCDS system, which redirects 
the query to the corresponding EPCIS systems. 
Finally, these EPCIS systems return the query result 
directly to the end user. 
The third model, the aggregating model operates 
similar to the relay model. The difference is that, 
instead of returning EPC event information directly 
to a user, each EPCIS system returns the result back 
to EPCDS, which aggregates the information 
returned from EPCIS systems before sending the 
aggregated result to the end user. The information in 
this case is shown in Figure 4. 
As the directory model, the relay model and the 
aggregating model satisfy different users' 
requirements, we consider all three models in our 
design and implementation. 
 
2.3. Related Work 
 
In order to improve supply chain visibility, RFID-
enabled supply chain network has drawn 
considerable attention from research and industrial 
community in recent years. Many track & trace 
systems are designed and implemented in the past 
decade, including IBM Theseos, DIALOG, and the 
system developed in BRIDGE project [3]. However, 
the problem of sharing supply chain information 
among different partners is still a challenging 
problem. A standard supply chain network, the 
EPCglobal network, is proposed to address this 
problem. 
To increase supply chain visibility, much related 
work has been focusing on the design and 
implementation of track & trace systems in the 
standard EPCglobal network [1, 5, 11]. However, the 
security and privacy problems have not been 
rigorously addressed in these works. 
Recently, many security mechanisms are 
proposed to protect different components of the 
EPCglobal network, including EPCIS, EPCONS, and 
EPCDS. For EPCIS, a fine-grained access control 
mechanism is proposed and implemented [12]. For 
EPCONS, a peer-to-peer name service architecture is 
proposed to enhance the data security of EPCONS 
and the privacy of the users [13]. However, this work 
is based on peer-to-peer system which does not fully 
conform to the EPCglobal network standards. 
Following to the work of EPCONS, a privacy-
enhanced discovery service is proposed to protect the 
privacy of users in EPCDS system [14], which is 
also based on peer-to-peer system. In [15], Yan et. al. 
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 consider an different situation where the EPCDS 
system is untrusted, and they propose a pseudonym-
based design to mitigate potential attacks. Their 
work does not conform to the standard EPCglobal 
network either and it is not practical in real world 
applications due to high overhead of converting EPC 
to pseudonyms. In [16], Shi et. al. proposed a secure 
track and trace system, in which they proposed a new 
approach to enhance the security of EPC discovery 
service system based on the relay model. However, 
as they mentioned, the EPCDS system and EPCIS 
system in their work do not fully conform to the 
standard EPCglobal network. 
Rigorous effort has been made in the research 
community on the security and privacy aspects of 
RFID systems [17]. However, these works mainly 
target at RFID communication systems, rather than 
EPCglobal network. Since the information shared in 
EPCglobal network is sensitive and valuable (e.g. 
inventory level, trading partners, and trading 
volumes), it is critical to address the security and 
privacy concerns in EPCglobal network. This is the 
focus of this paper. 
 
3. Secure Prototype for EPCglobal 
Network Services 
 
We design a secure platform for information 
sharing in EPCglobal network in this section. 
 
3.1. Architecture of Secure EPCglobal 
Network Services 
 
 
Figure 5. Architecture of Secure EPCglobal 
network Services 
 
The architecture of secure EPCglobal network 
services is shown in Figure 5. Different from the 
standard EPCglobal network services, an 
authentication server is added and the secure EPCDS 
and the secure EPCIS are used to replace the original 
EPCDS and EPCIS. The authentication server is 
designed to authenticate users in the whole 
EPCglobal network services. As there exists some 
work on authentication in EPCglobal network [4,7], 
we mainly focus on authorization in this paper. 
Different from the original EPCDS and EPCIS, both 
secure EPCDS and secure EPCIS support 
authorization to protect supply chain partners' data 
with access control policies. 
 
3.2. Secure EPC Information Service 
 
In the EPCglobal network, EPCIS is responsible 
for collecting event information from the filtering 
and collection middleware (ALE), and making these 
information available to authorized users. EPCIS is 
composed of an EPC repository and two standard 
interfaces, namely Capturing Interface and Query 
Interface. The Capturing Interface collects EPC 
event information from underlying application whilst 
the Query Interface allows users to retrieve event 
information. 
In the standard document on EPCIS, the security 
issues such as authentication and authorization are 
not fully addressed even though it is stated that 
authentication and authorization mechanisms should 
be implemented in EPCIS.  
We design a secure EPCIS (SecEPCIS) as an 
extension to the standard EPCIS. SecEPCIS consists 
of two primary functionalities as shown in Figure 6, 
i.e., data management and authorization 
management. Date management operates with four 
sub-functionalities, namely data storage, data 
capture, data query and data publish. The former 
three sub-functionalities are the same as in the 
standard EPCIS while the data publish is newly 
designed to allow SecEPCIS to automatically publish 
data into EPCDS for the purpose of reducing the data 
management cost of supply chain partners. 
Authorization management is introduced to allow 
supply chain partners to control the accesses to their 
data. It operates with the following four sub-
functionalities: policy storage, policy publish, policy 
management and access enforcement. Policy storage 
is in charge of storing the access control policies 
specified by supply chain partners; policy publish 
provides an option for supply chain partners to 
publish access control policies to EPCDS 
automatically; policy management is provided for 
supply chain partners to create, modify and delete 
their access control policies; finally, access 
enforcement is in charge of controlling users' 
accesses under the access control policies defined by 
supply chain partners. 
Following the functionalities given above, we 
design SecEPCIS as shown in Figure 7. SecEPCIS is 
made up of the following components: Enforcement, 
Data Storage, Data Publish, Policy Service, Policy 
Management, Policy Storage, Policy Transformation, 
and Policy Publish. In SecEPCIS, there are three 
kinds of interfaces, i.e., Query Interface, Capture 
Interface, and Policy Interface. In the following, we 
will describe how these components work together to 
achieve the functionalities of data capture, data 
query, data publish, and authorization. 
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 Figure 6. Functionalities of Secure EPCIS 
 
 


 

 

 
! 

" 
#
" 

" 
 
" 
$	
$	
#	
%&&
	
%&&
 	
%&& %&&
'
 
'
 
&"
'  '
%&& %&&
 
Figure 7. Architecture of secure EPCIS 
 
Data Capture. The filtering and collection 
middleware (i.e., ALE) publishes event information 
into SecEPCIS through the capture interface. 
SecEPCIS stores the event information in the Data 
Storage component. There is no difference between 
the capture interfaces of standard EPCIS and 
SecEPCIS. We do not provide any access control 
mechanism for capturing operation in SecEPCIS, as 
the operation happens in the domain of one supply 
chain partner, and we focus on the information 
sharing among different partners in this paper. 
Nonetheless, it is easy to implement an access 
control mechanism for data capture operation in a 
way similar to data query as stated below. 
Data Query. End users retrieve data from 
SecEPCIS through the query interface. After 
registering in the EPCglobal network, each user can 
submit queries to SecEPCIS through the query 
interface. When receiving a query from a user, the 
Enforcement component first authenticates the user 
and checks the integrity of this query. If both 
authentication and integrity check pass, the 
Enforcement component requests Policy Service to 
provide corresponding access control policies for this 
user. Policy Service searches for corresponding 
policies in the Policy Storage component, combines 
policies if multiple policies exist, and sends the 
combined policy back to Enforcement component. 
After receiving the combined policy, the 
Enforcement component processes the user's query 
under the control of the policy. Finally, the query 
result is sent to the user by this SecEPCIS. 
Data publish. SecEPCIS can automatically 
publish data into EPCDS so that the management 
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 cost of supply chain partners is reduced. If supply 
chain partners allow their SecEPCIS systems to 
automatically publish data into EPCDS, SecEPCIS 
retrieves data from the Data Storage component, 
filtering and publishing these data accordingly. 
SecEPCIS may also record certain auxiliary 
information such as which data has been published. 
Authorization. Supply chain partners manage 
access control policies through policy interface. With 
the policy interface, supply chain partners can define, 
modify and delete access control policies according 
to their security requirements. Take the creation of 
access control policy as an example: after receiving 
an access control policy, the Policy Management 
component first checks the syntax and sematic of the 
policy, processes the policy and stores it in Policy 
Storage if everything is normal. Another choice for a 
supply chain partner is to publish access control 
policies into EPCDS automatically. In this case, the 
newly created access control policy for SecEPCIS is 
sent to Policy Transformation component, which 
modifies the policy into access control policies 
suitable for EPCDS. The modified policies should be 
in accordance with the original policy defined by the 
supply chain partner. Finally, the modified policies 
are sent to the Policy Publish component and further 
published to EPCDS. The management of access 
control policies becomes easier for supply chain 
partners if they choose to automatically publish 
access control policies to EPCDS. The data publish 
and policy publish components help reduce the cost 
of supply chain partners and ease the adoption of 
EPCglobal network. 
 
3.3. Secure EPC Discovery Service 
 
The EPCglobal network is designed to support 
visibility of supply chains [4]. As an important part 
of EPCglobal network, EPCIS allows supply chain 
partners to exchange item-level information with 
each other provided that it is known which EPCIS 
systems have the item-level information about a 
given product. EPCDS is designed to provide a 
complementary lookup mechanism to enable supply 
chain partners to locate EPCIS systems for the item-
level information of interest. In other words, EPCDS 
is a search engine in EPCglobal network which 
enables global item-level information sharing among 
supply chain partners. 
To protect supply chain partners' index 
information in EPCDS, a secure EPCDS (SecEPCDS) 
is designed and implemented. Two primary 
functionalities in SecEPCDS are shown in Figure 8, 
namely data management and authorization 
management. Data management contains three sub-
functionalities, including data storage, data publish 
and data query, while authorization management 
includes policy storage, policy management and 
access enforcement. 
The system architecture of SecEPCDS is shown 
in Figure 9. SecEPCDS consists of the following 
components: enforcement, date storage, aggregation, 
policy service, policy management, policy storage, 
relay query, query interface, publish interface, and 
policy interface. In what follows, we describe how 
these components work together to achieve the 
functionalities of data publish, data query and 
authorization. 
Data publish. Supply chain partners publish data 
into SecEPCDS through the publish interfaces of 
their EPCIS systems. After receiving a data publish 
request, the enforcement component first 
authenticates the user, and checks the integrity of this 
request; next, it requests the policy service 
component to retrieve and combine corresponding 
access control policies; then, it processes the request 
under the control of the received policy. Finally, the 
published data is stored in the data storage 
component. 
Data query. There are three types of queries in 
SecEPCDS: abstract query, aggregating query and 
relay query. For abstract query, the procedure is 
similar to data publish. The enforcement component 
first authenticates a user and checks the integrity of a 
request; then it requests the policy service to provide 
the combined policy; finally it enforces the query 
under the control of the received policy and returns 
the result to the user. For aggregating query, 
SecEPCDS first executes the abstract query and 
obtains the addresses of EPCIS systems which have 
the detailed event information about the EPC 
submitted by the end user; then it sends the query 
and these addresses to the aggregation component. 
After receiving the request, the aggregation 
component requests relay query component to 
further retrieve the detailed event information from 
the corresponding EPCIS systems. After receiving 
the detailed event information, the aggregation 
component aggregates and returns the result to the 
user. The enforcement of relay query is similar to 
aggregating query, except for that SecEPCDS does 
not require the corresponding EPCIS systems to send 
query result back to it, instead, it requires them to 
send query result to the end users directly. 
Authorization. Similar to the authorization of 
SecEPCIS, supply chain partners can manage their 
access control policies through the policy interface in 
SecEPCDS. For example, after receiving policy 
creation request, the policy management component 
authenticates the user, checks the integrity of this 
request, processes the policy and stores the policy in 
the policy storage component. 
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Figure 8. Functionalities of Secure EPCDS 
 
 
Figure 9. Architecture of Secure EPCDS 
 
4. System Implementation 
 
In this section, we provide implementation details 
for the secure platform we designed in EPCglobal 
network. 
Following the recommendations from GS1 [4] 
and a related paper [7], our authentication server 
supports X.509 public key infrastructure (PKI) and 
password-based authentication as widely used in real 
world applications. 
We use attribute-based access control to secure 
EPCglobal network services, including SecEPCIS 
and SecEPCDS. An attribute-based access control 
policy is specified based on the attributes of subjects 
and objects as widely used in distributed systems 
[18]. In EPCglobal network, each supply chain 
partner has the flexibility to decide what access 
control policies to use in protecting its data in EPCIS 
and EPCDS. However, traditional access control 
models, such as discretionary access control (DAC), 
mandatory access control (MAC) and Role-based 
access control (RBAC) [18,19], are too restrictive 
and not flexible enough for EPCglobal network. 
Therefore, we design and implement an extended 
attribute-based access control for EPCglobal network 
services. The following example shows that 
traditional attribute based access control (which is 
more generic than DAC, MAC, and RBAC) cannot 
be applied directly due to specific security 
requirements in EPCglobal network. 
Example 1. Suppose that there are three supply 
chain partners in the EPCglobal network: 
Manufacturer M1, Distributor D1 and Retailer R1. 
They collect detailed event information and store it 
in their EPCIS systems. They also send index 
information to an EPCDS system. They define the 
following security policies to protect their EPC data: 
• P1 (defined by M1): Information about any 
product handled after 2011-01-01 can be 
accessed by supply chain partners who have 
International Journal of RFID Security and Cryptography (IJRFIDSC), Volume 2, Issues 1-4, Mar-Dec 2013
 
Copyright © 2013, Infonomics Society
114
 handled this product and are distributor 
companies. 
• P2 (defined by D1):  Information about any 
product whose EPC is 
urn:epc:id:404958810:* can be accessed by 
supply chain partners who have handled this 
product after D1 handles it. 
• P3 (defined by R1): Information about any 
product handled after 2011-03-01 can be 
accessed by supply chain partners who have 
handled this product before R1 handles it. 
In the above example, these security requirements 
cannot be specified using traditional attribute-based 
access control directly due to the term “who have 
also handled this product” in security requirements. 
Therefore, we extend traditional attribute-based 
access control to support this kind of security 
requirements which is common in practice.  
A visibility policy is used to formalize the term of 
“who have also handled this product” in the above 
example. For two supply chain partners A, B and an 
EPC e, there is a relationship between A and B: they 
are either in the same supply chain of e or not. This 
kind of relationship can be used to specify access 
control policies as shown in Example 1. Because 
such access control policies are related to the 
visibility of supply chains, we call them visibility 
policies.  
In this paper, we consider the following three 
kinds of visibility policies: whole-stream policy, up-
stream policy and down-stream policy. 
Definition 1. (whole-stream policy for EPC e 
defined by supply chain partner scp) The event 
information belonging to supply chain partner scp 
regarding EPC e can be accessed by any supply 
chain partners who have also handled the product 
associated with EPC e. 
Definition 2. (up-stream policy for EPC e defined 
by supply chain partner scp) The event information 
belonging to supply chain partner scp regarding EPC 
e can be accessed by any supply chain partners who 
have also handled the product associated with EPC e 
before scp handles it. 
Definition 3. (down-stream policy for EPC e 
defined by supply chain partner scp) The event 
information belonging to supply chain partner scp 
regarding EPC e can be accessed by any supply 
chain partners who have also handled the product 
associated with EPC e after scp handles it. 
 
4.1. Extended attribute-based access control 
 
Traditional attribute-based access control policies 
are specified based on subject attributes and object 
attributes. Our extended attribute-based access 
control policies involve an additional attribute: 
visibility attribute. 
• Subject attributes: A subject is a user, who 
queries or operates on event information. 
Each subject is associated with a set of 
attributes which define the identity and 
characteristics of the subject. Subject 
attributes may include subject identifier, 
name, country, and etc.  
• Object attributes: Object attributes are 
attributes of event, including EPC, Time, and 
etc. 
• Visibility attributes: Visibility attributes take 
three values: whole-stream, up-stream, and 
down-stream. 
An ABAC authorization language (AUL) is used 
to define who is allowed to perform what kind of 
query operations on what kind of data. The AUL is 
defined as follows: 
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where subject-condition, object-condition and 
visibility-condition are all Boolean conditions for 
subject attributes, object attributes and visibility 
attributes, respectively. All these conditions are 
constructed with the following rules: 
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Example 2. Using the extended attribute-based 
access control policy language, the policies in 
Example 1 can be specified as follows: 
• P1 = Time > 2011-01-01   Visibility = 
whole-stream   Role = distributor; 
• P2 = EPC like urn:epc:id:404958810:*  
Visibility = down-stream; 
• P3 = Time > 2011-03-01  Visibility = up-
stream.  
 
The extended attribute-based access control is 
powerful in terms of expressiveness as it is more 
generic than traditional attribute-based access control. 
However, it is not easy to enforce it efficiently. We 
exploit two critical techniques to enforce extended 
attribute-based access control in practice: policy 
transformation and query modification.  
Policy transformation is used to transform ABAC 
policies into fine-grained access control (FGAC) 
policies. In an FGAC policy, it assigns an SQL 
predicate to a user so as to express which data can be 
accessed by the user. FGAC policy is a special case 
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 of ABAC policy where the attribute of a subject is a 
user’ s ID. The transformation of an ABAC policy 
into FGAC policies takes two steps. First, an ABAC 
policy can be used to derive three different 
conditions: subject condition, object condition and 
visibility condition with subject attributes, object 
attributes and visibility attributes, respectively. 
Second, all users, who satisfy the subject condition, 
are associated with the object condition and the 
visibility condition.  
Query modification is used to enforce the 
transformed fine-grained access control policies. The 
basic idea of query modification is that before being 
processed, user queries are transparently modified to 
ensure that users can access only what they are 
authorized to access. The modification of a query 
takes in there steps. First, the visibility condition in 
FGAC policy is transformed into a SQL predicate. 
Then, the SQL predicate and the object condition are 
combined to construct a temporary view. Finally, the 
temporary view is used to replace the corresponding 
table in user’ s query. The detail of this process is 
provided in our previous paper [8]. 
 
4.2. Implementation of SecEPCIS and 
SecEPCDS 
 
We implement SecEPCIS by extending Fosstrak 
EPCIS [20] to support attribute-based access control 
with the following components: policy management, 
policy service, policy transformation, policy storage, 
policy publish, data publish and policy interface. In 
SecEPCIS, access control policies can be created by 
supply chain partners to protect their data. These 
policies can be published into SecEPCDS 
automatically if such choice is made. Users' queries 
are checked and modified under the corresponding 
access control policies before being executed. 
We implement our SecEPCDS prototype from 
scratch following the design introduced in Section 
3.3. In SecEPCDS, supply chain partners can publish 
event index information from their EPCIS systems 
and users can submit query for EPCIS systems which 
store the detailed event information of interest. In 
order to protect the data in SecEPCDS, supply chain 
partners can define attribute-based access control 
policies which are enforced against users' queries. 
Our SecEPCDS is developed in C-Sharp using SQL 
SERVER 2005 as its database. 
All interfaces in the secure platform of EPCglobal 
network are implemented as web services which are 
suitable for information sharing among distributed 
supply chain partners. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In Section 1, we provide three primary goals to 
guide the design of the secure platform for 
EPCglobal network services: 1) facilitating global 
information sharing among supply chain partners; 2) 
supporting authorization mechanism; 3) reducing the 
cost of managing and maintaining supply chain 
partners' data and authorization policies. All of these 
goals are met in the proposed secure platform. 
First, SecEPCDS is designed and implemented to 
facilitate global information sharing among supply 
chain partners. Each supply chain partner can publish 
index information into SecEPCDS through his own 
SecEPCIS. Users can locate SecEPCIS systems with 
the help of SecEPCDS and further query the 
corresponding SecEPCIS systems for detailed event 
data of interest. Users can also request SecEPCDS to 
help in querying the corresponding SecEPCIS 
systems and returning the aggregated result to them, 
since the aggregating model is supported in the 
platform. It is especially useful for those users who 
have limited computation and communication 
capabilities (e.g. mobile devices).  
Second, the authorization mechanisms are 
designed and implemented in SecEPCDS and 
SecEPCIS respectively. Supply chain partners can 
specify access control policies in SecEPCDS and 
SecEPCIS to protect their data.  
Third, in order to reduce the cost of managing 
data and access control policies, the data publish and 
policy publish mechanisms are designed and 
implemented in SecEPCIS. These two mechanisms 
help supply chain partners publish their event data 
and policies into SecEPCDS automatically.  
 
6. Track & Trace Application 
 
A track & trace application is one of the most 
important application in the EPCglobal network. In a 
track & trace application, supply chain partners can 
monitor their product in real time and optimize 
supply chain management; on the other hand, end 
consumers can evaluate the products they purchase. 
We design and implement a web-based track & trace 
application leveraging on EPCglobal network 
services. While supply chain partners can build their 
own track & trace applications leveraging on the 
interfaces provided in EPCIS and EPCDS, our track 
& trace application shows how this can be done in a 
large scale, including providing track & trace 
services to the end consumers. Our track & trace 
application, named DSIOT, is a web-based 
application which allows end consumers to tap on 
EPCglobal network from their desktop, laptop or 
even mobile phone. 
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Figure 10. Architecture of DSIOT 
 
 
Figure 11. Screenshot of DSIOT for an abstract query 
 
There are two goals for DSIOT application. First, 
it should allow supply chain partners and end 
consumers to easily track and trace products. Second, 
it should facilitate data management and policy 
management of supply chain partners. With DSIOT, 
supply chain partners can easily publish their data 
into EPCDS, mange their authorization policies and 
track products in supply chains. In particular, four 
kinds of functionalities are provided in DIOST:  
• Register: Any supply chain partner or end 
consumer can register into EPCglobal network 
through DSIOT; 
• Data publish: Supply chain partner can publish 
data into secure EPCDS system through DSIOT; 
• Policy management: The security administrators 
of supply chain partners can define, modify and 
delete authorization policies in secure EPCDS 
system through DSIOT; 
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 • Query: Any supply chain partner or end 
consumer can track & trace object in supply 
chain network by submitting queries to DSIOT. 
The architecture of DSIOT is shown in Figure 10. 
DSIOT is a web application built on top of secure 
EPCglobal network services so that supply chain 
partner or end consumer can access it through web 
browser. The DSIOT application interacts with the 
authentication server and the secure EPCDS system 
to achieve its goal. When supply chain partners 
register into the EPCglobal network, DSIOT sends 
the information to authentication server to complete 
the task; when supply chain partners submit data into 
EPCDS system or query information from EPCDS 
system, DSIOT sends the data or query to EPCDS 
system and shows results to end users. Since secure 
EPCDS system supports three different models - 
directory model, relay model and aggregating model, 
DSIOT provides three types of query for end users, 
namely abstract query, relay query and aggregating 
query. By sending abstract query, end users would 
receive the addresses of corresponding EPCIS 
systems; and by sending relay query, end users 
would receive detailed event information from 
corresponding EPCIS systems; by sending 
aggregating query, end users would receive the 
aggregated event information from EPCDS system. 
Figure 11 shows a screenshot of DSIOT for an 
abstract query. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The EPCglobal network, as an industrial standard, 
provides a platform to share information among 
supply chain partners. In order to protect the valuable 
information in EPCglobal network, we design a 
secure platform for information sharing in 
EPCglobal network which supports authentication 
and authorization. We also show the feasibility of 
our design by implement it with a web-based secure 
track & trace application.  
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